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Abstract 
‘Positive energy’ (zheng nengliang) is a popular buzzword in Chinese political 
discourse that has embodied mainstream political ideology in China since 2012. 
This term has also become prominent on Douyin, a prominent Chinese short-
video platform. By June 2018, there were over 500 Chinese governmental 
accounts on Douyin promoting ‘positive energy’ videos, with content being 
viewed over 1.6 billion times. Douyin even created a separate trending section 
called ‘Positive Energy’ for videos that promote the dominant State ideology. 
This study argues that the Positive Energy feature on Douyin is significant, as the 
Chinese government has accused, and even permanently shut down, several 
digital platforms for spreading what it considers ‘vulgarity’, or the antithesis of 
positive energy. Using the app walkthrough method and a content analysis of 
over 800 videos collected from the ‘Positive Energy’ section of Douyin, this 
study explores how Douyin promotes the Chinese State’s political agenda by 
promoting a new form of ‘playful patriotism’ online.  





#PositiveEnergy Douyin: Constructing ‘Playful Patriotism’ on a Chinese 
Short Video Application  
Introduction 
Douyin is a mobile short video platform first released in China in September 
2016 by Chinese tech giant ByteDance. It has recently become one of the most 
successful short-video platforms in the country. At a curator conference hosted by 
Douyin in August 2019, the platform’s general manager, Zhang Nan, claimed the app’s 
development was ‘beyond expectation’ as Douyin’s daily active users had reached 320 
million (China Daily, 2019). Government support is a necessity for the success of 
Chinese internet companies (Keane & Zhao, 2012) and Chinese information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) are often shaped by techno-nationalist policies 
(Plantin & Seta, 2019). Though not as closely associated with the Chinese government 
as Baidu, Alibaba, or Tencent (collectively ‘BAT’), ByteDance still reflects the logics 
of other major Chinese media companies who walk a fine line between achieving 
commercial goals and fulfilling political goals of the Chinese State (Zhao, 2008). On 
Douyin, users feel the presence of the Chinese State through the platform’s promotion 
of #PositiveEnergy trending videos.  
‘Positive energy (zheng nengliang)’ has been a buzzword in China’s political 
discourse since 2012 (Yang & Tang, 2018).  Positive energy generated a kind of 
‘transcendental Chinese patriotism’ (Du, 2014, p. 5) that differs from mainstream 
Chinese patriotism constructed by the State by being more ‘grassroots’ in nature. Since 
2012, however, the State has effectively appropriated the discourse of ‘positive energy’ 
and associated its meaning with ‘attitudes or emotions that are aligned with the 
ideological or value systems of the [Chinese Communist Party],’ (Yang & Tang, 2018, 




promoting Positive Energy, including government institutions and State media, whose 
videos had collectively amassed over 1.6 billion views (Zhulan, 2018). To support the 
State’s exploitation of ‘positive energy’, and in a symbolically important move, Douyin 
developed a separate Positive Energy trending section on its platform. The inclusion of 
this feature, which did not appear in earlier versions of Douyin, is important as it may 
have been added after a public relations incident in which parent company ByteDance 
ran up against China’s media regulator (Ho, 2018).  
The platform governance of Douyin appears to follow internet regulations from 
the State, similar to other Chinese video platforms (i.e. Lin & de Kloet, 2019; Wang & 
Lobato, 2019). In April 2018 ByteDance was required to permanently shut down 
Neihanduanzi, a humorous memes application, after the app was accused of spreading 
vulgarity online (Ho, 2018). Previous research has also evinced more complex and co-
regulatory governance frameworks in the way the Chinese government regulates its 
flagship digital platforms owned by BAT (Hong & Xu, 2019). In considering 
ByteDance, this study analyses how Douyin encapsulates values of Positive Energy into 
its platform to align with the State’s political agenda. This study offers insight as to how 
a Chinese short-video platform can be a tool to promote a more playful style of 
patriotism online. This digitally enacted playful patriotism reflects the State’s efforts to 
ally with Chinese grassroots cyber nationalism and lead it to be more consistent with the 
State’s patriotic agenda. 
This article begins by reviewing short videos as a medium alongside the Positive 
Energy phenomenon in China of the past decade. Next we discuss forms of Chinese 
patriotism and nationalism, as well as our conception of playfulness in the context of 
short video. We follow by describing our methodology; an app walkthrough of Douyin 




systematically collected from Douyin’s Positive Energy trending section. The findings 
and discussion section present themes from our analysis that support our development 
of playful patriotism, the process through which official accounts and individual users 
make patriotic content more palatable, appealing, and spreadable. We conclude by 
arguing that the emergence of playful patriotism on Douyin is emblematic of a broader 
shift in online nationalistic and patriotic discourse in Chinese digital media. 
Literature Review  
Short Video, Douyin, and Positive Energy 
Short video refers to video content that is shorter than five minutes, often between 15 
and 60 seconds, distributed digitally by platforms such as Douyin and many others. 
Short video is a relatively new media format with features such as low-cost production, 
highly spreadable content, and blurred boundaries between producers and consumers 
(Kong, 2018). By October 2018, an estimated 648 million users were on Chinese short 
video platforms like Kuaishou, Meipai, and Douyin (Su, 2019), accounting for almost 
80 percent of all internet users in China (CNNIC, 2019). Short video content has proven 
to be a valuable tool for aspiring online content creators (Mehta & Kaye, 2019). 
From the homepage, Douyin allows users to view algorithmically curated short 
videos in an endless scrolling mode (Elegant, 2019) (Figure 1). Users may also switch 
to view videos in a separate trending page. Trending videos on Douyin are 
agglomerated by hashtags (Figure 2) or collected under a separate special section on the 




page displays specific types of videos that conform to a specific state ideology.
 
Figure 1 Douyin Homepage 
 





Figure 3 Douyin Positive Energy page 
 
It is important to note that Douyin, like other short video and digital media 
platforms in China, are beholden to State governance that ‘demand[s] a compliant 
culture’ online (Lin & de Kloet, 2019, p. 4).  In recent years, the Cyberspace 
Administration of China (2017) has passed a series of regulations governing the 
emerging content production space, which dictate content on platforms must conform to 
official ideologies or face penalties 1.  
Moving on to the specific ideology promoted on Douyin, Positive Energy has 
become a widely used keyword in Chinese social and political discourse (Yang & Tang, 
2018). Originally stemming from Western positive psychology, earlier iterations of 
Positive Energy in China were associated with re-appropriating scientific terminology 
into lay language and referencing Chinese folk beliefs of charity, emotionality, and 
psychology (Yang & Tang 2018, p. 10). More recently, Positive Energy has been used 
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to describe Chinese wellbeing, prosperity, and national strength, as part of a broader 
political narrative of Chinese happiness (Hird, 2018). 
Positive energy first appeared in China in the early 2000s (Yang & Tang, 2018) 
and was popularized during the 2012 London Olympics, around the same time as the Xi 
Jinping government came to power (Triggs, 2019). The term is widely described as a 
grassroots movement, for its seemingly spontaneous emergence in China (Du, 2014). 
Positive energy focuses on ‘societal and moral issues accompanying marketisation and 
undermining Party dominance, the reinforcing of a common duty to resolve such 
problems in unison with the state, a promotion of active moral behaviour, and support 
for state control of the Internet,’ (Triggs, 2019, p. 105), making it a useful byword to 
promote Chinese patriotism and nationalism. 
State-Sponsored Patriotism and Cyber-Nationalism in China 
 Chinese nationalism (minzu zhuyi) is rooted in the nation’s century-long fight against 
invasions from Western and Japanese imperialist forces since the 1839 Opium War 
(Harris, 1997). Nationalism is described as ‘an undercurrent’ that has shaped ‘China’s 
political landscape in the past century’ (Wu, 2007, p. 73), particularly amid the 
backdrop of China’s rising global economic and political influences in recent decades 
(Cheung, 2012; Harris, 1997). Previous research attributes the contemporary surge in 
Chinese nationalism to governmental campaigns, such as the State-led ‘Patriotic 
Education Campaign’ beginning in the 1990s (Zhao, 1998; 2004). 
Wu (2007, p. 72) differentiates Chinese state-sponsored patriotism (aiguo zhuyi) 
from Chinese nationalism (minzu zhuyi); ‘patriotism refers to one’s love toward one’s 
state or government, and nationalism refers to one’s feeling toward a set of symbols of 




sometimes, but they may conflict with each other too,’ (p. 73). Indeed, the ruling State 
party has never officially endorsed Chinese nationalism (minzu zhuyi) and has instead 
advocated for a Chinese patriotism that conflates the ‘love’ toward the State with the 
‘love’ toward the Communist Party of China (Zhao, 1998). While the State has 
constructed state-sponsored patriotism to legitimise its regime (Cheung, 2012; Wu, 
2007), a rival ideology, Chinese cyber nationalism, has emerged on the Chinese internet 
over the past twenty years (Gries, 2005; Wu, 2007). 
Chinese cyber nationalism is a bottom-up spontaneous nationalistic sentiment 
fuelled by internet users’ perceptions of external threats against China (Liu, 2012; Wu, 
2007). A distinguishing feature of Chinese cyber nationalism its grassroots and 
spreadable style, which contrasts with the State’s more traditional forms of top-down 
patriotic propaganda (Guo & Yang, 2016). As an example, in February 2009 Chinese 
users began circulating the slogan ‘Go! Baobao2! (Baobao jiayou!)’ to support Wen 
Jiabao, former Premier of China, in response to an anti-China protestor who had 
interrupted Wen’s speech at Cambridge University (Qiu, 2015). Baobao jiayou was 
spontaneously popularized by Chinese internet users, which illustrates the more light-
hearted and humorous language used in expressions of Chinese cyber-nationalism.  
Humorous content and memes also play an important role in Chinese cyber-
nationalism. Memes are not restricted to one platform or template (Highfield & Leaver, 
2016). Here we define memes as a form of sharable and remixable visual content spread 
through imitation and competition among users (Ask & Abidin 2018; Shifman, 2013). 
Qiu (2015) notes the rise of ‘image-driven nationalism’ in Chinese internet discourses, 
meaning large amounts of memes circulated in response to Chinese online nationalistic 
 




events. A culminating moment for Chinese nationalistic memes was the 2016 ‘Diba 
Expedition’. On the night of 20 January 2016, thousands of mainland Chinese internet 
users from an online group called ‘Diba’ surged through China’s primary digital 
censorship apparatus, known as the Great Firewall of China (GFW), to bombard 
Taiwanese pro-independence Facebook pages such as the page of Taiwan’s president, 
Tsai Ing-wen, and Sanlih News. The coordinated action included posting slogans like 
‘D8 Goes to Battle, Nothing Will Grow’ and other Chinese nationalistic messages and 
memes; some playful, others more aggressive (Guo & Yang, 2016, p. 54). As Facebook 
has been banned in mainland China since 2013, Chinese internet users had to use virtual 
private networks (VPN) for their ‘expedition’ and the entire event was live streamed on 
Chinese social media platforms. As a result, the topic ‘Diba Expedition’ went viral on 
Chinese social media, demonstrating how playful and memetic internet culture can 
morph into nationalistic expressions (Han, 2019; Wang, 2016). 
Compared to state-sponsored patriotism, another distinguishing feature of 
Chinese online nationalism is that it often includes expressions of extreme populism 
(Guo & Yang, 2016). In contrast to State-sponsored patriotism that aims to legitimise 
the Party-State, the bottom-up online nationalistic sentiments might be destabilising to 
Chinese society with its populistic and unpredictable nature (Han, 2019). Chinese 
scholars have criticised this populistic nationalism as parochial nationalism under the 
‘disguise’ of patriotism (i.e. Liu, 2016; Zhao, 2007). The patriotic ‘disguise’ of Chinese 
cyber nationalism may stem from the loose usage of ‘patriotism’ in the Chinese 
language. For example, Liu (2012) interviewed Chinese university-student internet 
users who expressed that ‘the nation is higher and greater than the party-government,’ 
online (p. 63). Interviewees embraced the idea of ‘aiguo zhuyi (patriotism)’ in their 




state-sponsored patriotism (Liu, 2012). However, Liu found that students’ 
understanding of aiguo zhuyi differed from the Chinese governmental construction of 
patriotism, in that it was more populist and nationalistic.  
The Chinese State has taken assertive action to address the incongruities 
between Chinese cyber nationalism and official state-sponsored patriotism (Wang, 
2016).  However, prior to the 2010s, the Chinese State appeared to be unskilled in 
harnessing or domesticating Chinese cyber nationalism as they lacked sufficient 
understanding of internet logics and cultures, as well as the advanced regulatory 
technologies, that would aid them in their mission of political indoctrination (Plantin & 
Seta, 2019).  
Cultivating the Chinese Patriotic Internet 
The advancement of internet industries in China has been associated with the 
political agenda of ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘national rejuvenation’ (Keane & Chen, 2017), 
which can be interpreted as an effort of the Chinese government to imbue Chinese 
technology industries and technology policies, such as renewable energy and ICTs, with  
techno-nationalism (Kennedy, 2013). Techno-nationalism is the belief that technology 
is a crucial element of national security and a vital national asset (Kennedy, 2013). 
Chinese techno-nationalism is more consistent with the state-sponsored patriotism, but 
distinguishable from the extremist and populist ‘cyber nationalism’. In order to shape 
the techno-nationalist internet, the State has continuously tightened its control over the 
Chinese internet through internet censorship systems (Plantin & Seta, 2019).  Many, 
like the GFW, have been ongoing projects since the mid-1990s and have required major 
financial investments and commitments from designers, architects and providers to 




of ICT infrastructures, the iterations of Chinese internet applications - from web-based 
portals to mobile platforms - have been driven mainly by entrepreneurial innovations.  
By the 2010s, regulatory technologies, such as the GFW, had matured 
significantly (Plantin & Seta, 2019). The development of State strategies for engaging 
with the internet, on the other hand, went through several phases of transition. First, the 
Chinese government implemented a structural change in its internet management, 
shifting from a model of centralised top-down control to decentralised and elastic model 
of engagement (Wu, 2007). Wu (2007, p.109) describes this approach as a ‘composite 
horizontal-vertical’ style of managing the internet. This governing strategy ensured the 
State kept a tight grasp on the internet up until the advent of Chinese digital platforms. 
After China’s major micro-blog service, Weibo, launched in 2009, the platform quickly 
became a public space for discussing social issues and political dissidence (Wang, 
2013). In response, Chinese authorities took a proactive approach to engaging with 
Weibo by introducing tens of thousands of governmental accounts. These Weibo 
accounts propagate official messages to guide public opinion, enhancing the Chinese 
government’s influence over the micro-blogging sphere (Schlæger & Jiang, 2014; 
Sullivan, 2014).  
Additionally, the Chinese government has sought to adopt an innovative style of 
propaganda, given the traditional political indoctrination has become incompatible with 
the fast-changing internet cultures. Memetic styles communication has become the most 
salient part in internet cultures among younger Chinese generations (Guo, 2018).   The 
example of the ‘Diba Expedition’ (Han, 2019) illustrates how memetic communication 
can be effectively utilised by Chinese cyber-nationalists.  Thus, understanding memetic 
online cultures would aid State social media accounts to effectively exploit affordances 




internet cultures are now being adopted by various State institutions. In certain online 
incidents, such as the Leon Dai incident in 2016, the State social media accounts 
succeeded in using memes to advocate their own style of state-sponsored patriotism and 
build alliances with nationalist netizens (Guo, 2018).  
Separately from State actors, Chinese netizens are also joining propagandist 
discourses online in what Repnikova and Fang (2018, p. 765) term ‘authoritarian 
participatory persuasion 2.0’ (APP 2.0). APP 2.0 directly engages ordinary users in co-
producing persuasive propaganda content. This approach, spurred by President Xi, 
marks a clear departure from earlier approaches to online propaganda that were more 
‘overt and crude’ (Repnikova & Fang, 2018, p. 763) and represent a counterpart to 
grassroots online resistance against State propaganda.   
Douyin is a useful case study to explore novel State patriotism promulgated by 
APP 2.0 (Repnikova & Fang, 2018). Its format and content creation tools make it a 
digital tabula rasa for playful creators and State actors. On Douyin, users can easily 
engage in creating, viewing and sharing short-videos and participate in playful and fluid 
meme cultures. With the introduction of the Positive Energy trending page, State 
accounts, actors and patriotic users have their own unique space to post and share 
patriotic content alongside non-patriotic humorous meme content. 
As noted above, Douyin features a Positive Energy trending section that is 
designed to promote more a specific type of patriotic content. To analyse Douyin’s 
Positive Energy section, we adopt Nieborg and Poell’s (2018) platformization of 
cultural production theoretic framework. Platformization argues that digital platforms 
develop new approaches and strategies and adapt their digital infrastructures to match 
changing markets and governance. These digital infrastructures, markets, and 




In China, the volatile Chinese commercial and political environment has required 
platforms to adapt digital architectures in accordance with state-imposed platform 
regulations (Wang & Lobato, 2019). Further, Duffy, Neiborg, and Poell (2019) recently 
called for further investigation into platform practices defined as the ‘strategies, 
routines, experiences, and expressions of creative labour and citizenship that shape 
cultural production through platforms,’ (p. 2). Platform practices on Douyin involve 
creating, viewing and sharing short-videos and participating in playful and fluid internet 
cultures. On the Positive Energy trending page, State actors, as well as ordinary users, 
participate by viewing, promoting and interacting with content that fit with a broader 
Chinese statecraft agenda.  
We argue below that the inclusion of a Positive Energy section on Douyin 
fosters the platformization of political indoctrination using the cultural logics of the 
Chinese internet. Douyin’s Positive Energy section is unlikely to be a State-run project. 
The platform is one of ByteDance’s core commercial products that derives its value 
from user innovation and was developed for the Chinese social media entertainment 
market; it was not designed to be a state-controlled propaganda machine. However, by 
adding a dedicated Positive Energy section, Douyin can be a powerful tool to promote 
state-sponsored patriotism through playful short videos and Douyin’s platform 
practices. As such, this study asks: how does the platformization of Positive Energy on a 
playful short-video platform reinforce Chinese patriotism? 
Methodology  
We employ the app walkthrough method (Light, Burgess, & Duguay, 2018) and 
content analysis (Neuendorf, 2017) to investigate how Douyin is used as a tool to 




walkthrough method. An app walkthrough is ‘a way of engaging directly with an app’s 
interface to examine its technological mechanisms and embedded cultural references to 
understand how it guides users and shapes their experiences’ (Light et al., 2018, p. 882). 
Recent studies have employed the app walkthrough to study the Chinese platforms iQiyi 
(Wang & Lobato, 2019) and Kuaishou (Lin & De Kloet, 2019). We conducted multiple 
walkthroughs of Douyin in August 2019, during which we systematically identified 
Douyin’s features for creating, sharing, and interacting with content. We also identified 
structures related to Douyin’s app governance, which is hardcoded into certain features 
and formally articulated through Terms of Service (ToS).  
Next, we conducted a content analysis to investigate videos collected from 
Douyin’s ‘Positive Energy’ section. We sampled videos from Douyin’s positive energy 
page, which is publicly available for viewing and, in certain cases, downloading without 
signing into a Douyin account. Between 29 August and 7 October 2019, we manually 
collected 800 videos and their associated metadata, such as captions, publishers, and 
view count by taking screenshots and downloading the top twenty-five Positive Energy 
videos each day. Unlike videos displayed on the highly personalized endless scrolling 
portal, trending and positive energy videos are not influenced by user preference or 
location. We collected all 20 videos that appeared in the Positive Energy category at 
each moment of collection. To minimize algorithmic bias, we collected all the videos in 
our sample without signing into an account on Douyin. Because our video data were 
collected during the 2019 Hong Kong protests and leading up to the 70th anniversary of 
the People's Republic of China, the content analysis offers insights into Douyin’s 
construction of patriotic discourses during politically significant events, however we 




The 800 videos in our dataset were published by 275 unique accounts. We 
delineated these accounts into five categories: government agencies, educational 
institutions, state media, commercial media, and individual accounts. Two coders 
manually categorised the accounts and we calculated Cohen’s Kappa based on a random 
sample of 20 percent of accounts to measure the intercoder reliability (κ=0.78), which 
indicated a substantial agreement between two coders. We then conducted a thematic 
analysis of short video content informed by our initial walkthrough findings. We 
employed multi-step coding to identify themes by coding a subset of our total sample. 
We randomly sampled 500 videos from the Positive Energy section for thematic coding. 
In the first stage, we attached labels to each video to denote themes. In the second step, 
labels were organised into higher thematic categories. These non-exclusive themes and 
sub-themes were the basis of our code book. We again calculated intercoder reliability 
between the two coders using Cohen’s Kappa (κ= 0.81).  
Findings and Discussion 
Data analysis proceeded in two phases. First our walkthrough identified four 
aspects in which Douyin promotes ‘positive energy’ through its features and app 
governance. First, promoting Chinese socialism is explicitly stated in Douyin’s ToS. 
Second, as noted above, positive energy is hardcoded in Douyin’s features, namely in 
the Positive Energy trending section. Third, positive energy content is facilitated by 
Douyin’s tight content moderation, which relies on a vast dedicated team of moderators 
and Bytedance’s proprietary algorithm that curates trending hashtags and content. 
Fourth, we noted ‘positive energy’ content from state media accounts on Douyin are 




Our walkthrough and content analysis revealed that content posted by State 
media accounts on Douyin clearly deviate from their posts on other platforms or 
traditional media. As we note above, positive energy has been used explicitly by the 
State to promote its ideologies on Chinese social media (Triggs, 2019; Yang & Tang, 
2018). These studies focus on the state’s construction of the positive energy discourse 
on more traditional social media such as Weibo. Previous research has examined how 
short-video platforms empower (disadvantaged) individuals (i.e. Li, Tan, & Yang, 
2019), but almost no studies yet consider how these short-video platforms could 
potentially be appropriated by the state. In examining how Douyin constructs patriotism 
through short videos, we first consider how the platform governance and features of 
Douyin, framed by platformization (Nieborg & Poell, 2018), supports patriotism. 
Second, we describe how patriotism is constructed through playful positive energy 
videos and finally we discuss the role of playfulness in Chinese platformed patriotism. 
Platform Governance and Features  
Based on our walkthrough, Chinese patriotism is supported and facilitated by 
Douyin’s infrastructure and platform governance, specifically the inclusion of the 
‘Positive Energy’ trending page. We found no publicly available data as to when 
exactly the ‘Positive Energy’ feature was added to Douyin. From the archive of 
Douyin’s update logs, however, we can see that the Positive Energy section was not a 
feature of the platform when it debuted. The addition of this feature might be related to 
the shutdown of ByteDance’s app, Neihanduanzi, in April 2018 due to vulgarity. This 
event pushed ByteDance to rethink how it could better align with the State’s dominant 




published an extensive apology letter3, vowing to promote socialist core values in 
Bytedance’s products and Douyin’s general manager Zhang Nan explicitly stated that 
Douyin should imbue positive energies in the platform. This shift highlights Douyin’s 
efforts to balance its commercial pursuits alongside the Chinese State’s interventions. If 
ByteDance were to completely revamp the platform replete with Positive Energy videos 
they might risk a loss of their user base. In response to the State’s warning, ByteDance 
may have inadvertently, or perhaps intentionally, transformed Douyin into a digital 
enclave for the State to promote its positive energy brand of patriotism.  
Further, platform governance on apps is ‘often enacted through formal Terms of 
Service (ToS) documents and informally by encouraging users to behave in ways that 
align with the norms of the ideal forms of user the app is targeted at’ (Light et al., 2018, 
p. 890). The ToS of Douyin states that the content, ‘undermining the regime, 
overthrowing the socialist system, inciting secessionism, and subverting the unification 
of the country,’ is forbidden on the platform (Douyin, 2019, p. 1). 
In this way, Douyin formally states that content posted on the platform should 
align with the ‘socialist core values’ in China. We acknowledge that Douyin is not 
forcing users to agree to create videos that promote socialist core values; nowhere on 
the platform or in Douyin’s ToS is there mention that users should post positive energy 
videos.  Still, the volume of videos posted in the Positive Energy section from a variety 
of State and individual accounts, many with millions of views, clearly suggests to users 
what types of content creation is deemed to be ‘positive’ on Douyin.  
 





Positive Energy Videos 
In our analysis we determined two strategies of providing content in Douyin’s ‘Positive 
Energy’ section. First, based on our categorisation of Douyin accounts in our dataset, 
(Table 1), we determined Chinese governmental accounts to be the core providers of 
positive energy videos. This includes all accounts related to the state institutions, 
including State media accounts (e.g. People’s Daily), government agencies, and official 
groups (e.g. Communist Youth League of China). As Table 1 displays, the majority of 
videos from the ‘positive energy’ section were published by state media or state 
institutions. Of the 274 accounts, 151 (55%) were affiliated with the Chinese 
government, which accounted for 504 (63%) of the 800 videos in the total pool 
sampled. Further, the average view count for state media accounts was higher than 
individual accounts, commercial accounts, and educational accounts. These 
governmental accounts were relatively new to Douyin, but they have been highly active 
in other Chinese social media (i.e. Weibo) promoting Chinese patriotism (Guo, 2018).  
We also found governmental accounts native to short-video platforms. For 
example, Young Video (xiaoyang shipin), affiliated with China Central Television 
(CCTV), posted 77 (9.6%) videos during our data collection. Young Video is a State-
sponsored content creator dedicated to creating and distributing content on short-video 
platforms such as Kuaishou and Douyin. Our content analysis indicated a consistency in 
the way governmental accounts promote and construct ideology on Douyin, which 
similar to a state-sponsored patriotism that conflates a love of country with love of the 
state-party (Zhao, 1998). We found that videos from governmental accounts featured in 
the Positive Energy section were primarily designed for promoting patriotism and 
videos from individual or commercial accounts featured in the positive energy section 




Table 1 Account Categories, Video Count, and View Count 
 
The second strategy we observed to shape Positive Energy was to ensure themes 
of videos posted to the eponymous trending tab were consistent and comprehensive. 
Generally, the themes of these videos in Douyin’s Positive Energy section fell into two 
major categories: the positive representation of the nation in the macro level; and, the 
positive representation of the people in the micro level. Beyond these two broad 
thematic groups, we categorised positive energy videos into seven non-mutually 










The macro-level construction of patriotism features videos such as Chinese 
military forces, support for the Hong Kong police, and celebrations of the 70th 
anniversary of China. Videos featuring macro-level construction of patriotism are 
evident in fostering national pride. Those videos focused on depicting the national 
prosperity and advance with introducing high-tech projects, such as space flight 
projects, 5G mobile networks, and nuclear power plants. On top of this, these videos 
also featured a playful tone that imbue funny, cheerful elements into serious and 
technological content. With light-hearted background music and playful video edits, 
national pride has been embedded in captions such as ‘Thumbs up for Chinese 
projects!’  and ‘1958, China ended its history of relying on importing penicillin!’ The 
micro-level construction of harmony among individuals features videos promoting filial 
piety (the responsibility to care for one’s family), sibling love and role models (e.g. 




which included videos featuring both ‘elite role models’ (e.g. top scientists, mechanics, 
doctors) and everyday ‘grassroots role models’ (e.g. delivery couriers, cleaners, bus 
drivers)4. Videos in this category linked individuals’ dedication and success to the 
harmony and advance of the country. For ‘elite role models’, videos often associated the 
achievements of these individuals with the achievements of the nation. For example, a 
video featuring a welder of Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant welding an important and 
dangerous piece of machinery was repetitively posted for 13 days (Figure 4). This video 
was posted by an account titled ‘The artisan of the great nation (daguo gongjiang)’, 
which is another CCTV project. In these types of videos, being an elite role model 
means devote oneself to building the country. One will be admired for contributing to 
the country’s social, economic and technological developments.  
 
Figure 4 The artisan welder of Tianwan nuclear plant 
 
4
 We acknowledge the problematic nature of using such dichotomous language of ‘elites’ and 
‘grassroots.’ However, as with previous scholars, we note that these terms are included based solely on 




The videos depicting the ‘grassroots role models’ promoted ordinary altruism 
that contributes to the stability and harmony of Chinese society. These videos were 
posted both by State media accounts and individual user accounts. Role models in these 
videos included manual labourers, such as public janitors. In our sample, we found one 
video featuring a public janitor cleaning a playground created by an individual account 
that was featured on ‘Positive Energy’ for 10 different days. This video is titled ‘Pay 
our respect to those lovely people. Because of you, our city is becoming better. #The 
loveliest people #pay respect to public janitors,’ (Figure 5).  Like many other Douyin 
short videos, the plot of this video is self-evident from its title.  
 
Figure 5 Pay Respect to Public Janitors 
 These ‘grassroots role model’ individuals can come from a variety of 
unexpected areas. In our coded sample, we found six videos featuring food delivery 
couriers, among which one of them was posted for three consecutive days on the 
Positive Energy section. This video was posted by Huacheng +, a Douyin account 
affiliated with the Guangzhou government, titled ‘#HuachengPositiveEnergy’ with the 




cleaned sewage on his way, his hands were soaked into pale. @Douyin Assistant. 
Several ‘grassroots’ role model videos also challenged the impression of Douyin’s 
‘middle-classed sensitivities’ (Li et al., 2019, p. 9). The ‘grassroots role model’ videos 
depict the proletariat sensibilities of the Chinese communist regime, whose endorsement 
of ‘grassroots role models’ is helpful in constructing the patriotic sentiments among 
everyday citizens and is therefore important to legitimize the State regime. 
According to Douyin’s general manager, Zhang Nan, the aim of promoting 
Positive Energy on Douyin is to align the platform’s ideology with core socialist values. 
Core socialist values was first mentioned by former Chinese president Hu Jintao, 
including ‘prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony at the national level; freedom, 
equality, justice, and rule of law as societal values, and patriotism, dedication, integrity, 
and geniality as citizens’ concerns,’ (Gow, 2017, p. 99). Our findings suggest Douyin 
has its own emphasis in promoting core socialist values in the Positive Energy section. 
Among all the videos we analysed, we found none that explicitly fit the theme of 
promoting democracy. Instead, videos focused on promoting ‘harmony’ and 
‘patriotism’ on a macro and micro level. In Chinese Confucian culture, supported by the 
State, the nation is often viewed as an extended family. The harmony of the family (jia) 
and the strength of the nation (guo) are closely related concepts (Wang, 2019). We, 
therefore, argue that videos in the Positive Energy section that promote micro-level 
harmony also contribute to the macro-level construction of patriotism.   
Playful Patriotism 
Based on the foregoing discussions of our findings on the Positive Energy 
section we propose the term playful patriotism to encapsulate how the Chinese State is 




endorsed, but not necessarily orchestrated, light-hearted or amusing media content that 
promotes an established State ideology, in this case ‘positive energy’.  
We specifically employ the term ‘playful,’ as playfulness connotes a light-
hearted tone; something intended for amusement rather than to be taken seriously 
(OED, 2019). As discussed above, we observed playfully patriotic content posted by 
both individual and State media accounts. We argue this content, selected and 
distributed by Douyin in the ‘Positive Energy’ section, is distinct from previously 
reported norms of Chinese cyber-nationalism discussed above (Liu, 2012; Wu, 2007). 
Our findings suggest videos in Douyin’s ‘Positive Energy’ section approach serious 
topics in an unserious manner, both from State actors and individuals. Further, our 
observations suggest that content created by State accounts is more ‘playful’ in 
comparison with the State political indoctrination efforts in pre-digital media era and 
later via governmental web-based portals.  
We understand most content in the Positive Energy section as ‘patriotic’ 
because, as discussed above, patriotism has been a key concept in defining ‘Positive 
Energy’ in China (Triggs, 2019; Yang and Tang, 2018).  Importantly, we do not suggest 
that all videos posted by State accounts on Douyin exemplify playful patriotism. 
However, we do suggest that the Positive Energy section was deployed as a vehicle to 
promote playful patriotism, as we found 95% of videos coded from the Positive Energy 
section directly or indirectly promoted either macro or micro level constructions of 
patriotism.  
The themes we developed through our analysis are somewhat unsurprising in 
terms of the ideological messaging used to construct patriotism on Douyin. As we have 
seen, positive energy videos can take several forms and the ways in which they support 




a playful platform. If the positive energy section was filled with more serious, 
traditional patriotic content, it would be a jarring departure from other content found on 
the main trending page or homepage. Through creating unserious or light-hearted 
patriotic content, the patriotic videos in the Positive Energy section fit with the overall 
playful culture constructed on Douyin.  
Further, by creating playful patriotic content the State can capitalize on the 
power and spreadability of memes. After all, memes are pliable and can take on lives of 
their own long after their original creation (Katz & Shifman, 2017). Meme content has 
also been shown to be a useful medium for fomenting image-driven nationalism in 
China (Qiu, 2015). If the messages encoded into positive energy videos aim to 
encourage patriotism, playful meme content is the obvious choice for a platform like 
Douyin. Our findings indicate that State actors have learned to adjust the packaging of 
their message to fit Douyin’s platform practices. As noted, the content posted by some 
State accounts to Douyin is, in some cases, quite different in tone from content these 
organizations would publish in other media. By learning to play by Douyin’s rules, 
State actors may tap into younger markets or audiences that would be harder to reach 
with traditional patriotic content.  
Playful content can also potentially ameliorate sensitive or controversial topics 
in Chinese media. As we note, the timeframe when we collected our sample coincided 
with a tense moment for the Chinese government during the mid to late 2019 Hong 
Kong extradition bill protests (BBC News, 2019). In our sample, we observed several 
videos that present soldiers acting silly or relatable, by depicting unusual or everyday 
action. One popular video, for example, showed a group of soldiers enthusiastically 
cheering for the National Volleyball Team during the parade of the 70th anniversary of 




with the serious or severe in which they are usually presented in Chinese media. In this 
way, presenting Chinese military in playful view offers another avenue for State media 
to combat conflicting narratives from within China or from international media.   
Playful patriotism is not state PR as such. As we observe on Douyin, popular 
playful patriotism content can be replicated, imitated, or even originated by individual 
users or non-State accounts. Owing to the market in which Douyin as a platform exists, 
our findings suggest there are individuals and organizations who post content to 
Positive Energy due to their own sense of patriotism (Wu, 2007). These feelings of 
national pride or patriotism are not unique to Chinese citizens; however, Douyin 
provides a special digital space for Chinese users to express those nationalist sentiments 
and express them playfully.   
Conclusion 
Over the past twenty years, Chinese patriotism and nationalism has moved 
through several iterations online; from the digitalized traditional state-sponsored 
patriotism carried over from the pre-internet era, to the undercurrent of radical populist 
cyber-nationalism circulated by independent internet-savvy cyber-patriots, to the 
utopian techno-nationalism that hails Chinese technological superiority as the pathway 
to future prosperity. Playful patriotism represents a new variant that combines the 
messaging of state-sponsored patriotism with the savvy of cyber-nationalism, which 
scaffolds well with future-oriented techno-nationalism. The inclusion of the Positive 
Energy trending section offers the potential to transform Douyin from a purely mobile 
media entertainment short-video platform towards a more patriotic Chinese online 
space, similar to the State’s earlier harnessing of Weibo (Zheng, 2013). This study thus 




reinforce social norms and structures in China. We also contribute to the growing body 
of literature on Chinese digital platforms by operationally defining playful patriotism as 
a construct for further use and analysis on Chinese platforms, short video or 
otherwise. Finally, this study contributes to advancing a clearer conception of Chinese 
patriotism online. Whereas Chinese cyber-nationalism has been found to promote 
patriotism externally, or outside Chinese borders, such as in the ‘Diba Incident’ (Liu, 
2012), playful patriotism in the Positive Energy section of Douyin depicts a much more 
internally-focused patriotism to support the legitimacy of the Chinese government from 
within. Future studies should continue to explore the distinctions between internal and 
external-facing manifestations of patriotism online. 
This study sheds insight on State attempts to platformize authoritarian 
participatory persuasion 2.0 (Nieborg & Poell, 2018; Repnikova & Fang, 2018) in 
China. Rather than overt propagandist strategy, we argue that Douyin’s construction of 
playful patriotism is more akin to camouflage; Bytedance’s survival tactic rather than 
the true aim of the platform. As a commercial enterprise, Bytedance has no intent to 
challenge State regulators. It focuses more on playful content to generate profit. Even 
so, like other Chinese media companies before it (Zhao, 2008), ByteDance must comply 
with a State fixated on promoting patriotism for social stability and the legitimacy of its 
regime (Wu, 2007). Following the closure of Neihanduanzi, the addition of a Positive 
Energy section on Douyin appears to be a clear signal that ByteDance is willing to make 
creative compromises with the State that do not alter the fabric of Douyin.  On the other 
hand, affordances of popular Chinese social media are not necessarily designed by the 
State; instead, the State also needs to ‘learn’ logics of radically evolved digital media to 
engage with digital platforms to achieve political ends. As a predominately mobile app, 




cultures afforded by Douyin to effectively engage with Chinese netizens on short-video 
apps.  
We must acknowledge that findings from this study should be interpreted within 
the unique historical context during which our data were collected. Due to time 
limitations, our data set were collected during two historic events: the 70th anniversary 
of the CCP and the 2019 Hong Kong Protests and it was not possible for us to collect 
archival videos from earlier in 2019. Future studies may replicate our methodology at 
different moments to investigate the persistence of playful patriotism on Douyin.  
As more studies begin to explore Chinese platform practices and 
platformization, researchers should keep a watchful eye for manifestations of playful 
patriotism. Even on platforms where a specific positive energy section is not present, 
there are still opportunities for the Chinese State to incorporate its novel approaches to 
propaganda in the form of playful patriotism. Recent studies illustrate that platform 
practices (Duffy, Nieborg, & Poell, 2019) are rapidly evolving in China. The 
programmatic content on certain platforms is become more depersonalized and unified 
(Wang & Lobato, 2019). Further, individual content creators are finding ways to use the 
unique Chinese platform affordances, markets, and governance to achieve success (Lin 
& De Kloet, 2019). As we observe here, technology companies, like ByteDance, are 
learning to appease the State by adding features like Positive Energy to their platforms. 
Further exploration of the Chinese State’s shifting strategies to harness the disruptive 
power of platforms will help disentangle the unique and contradictory logics of Chinese 
digital spaces; spaces like Douyin, which appears to be increasingly patriotic, albeit 
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